This week’s lesson discussed the stages of moral development as well as a variety of moral intensity factors. Consider and comment on the following question BY USING 350 WORDS WITH A REFERENCE:

1. Identify one well-known person today (politician, celebrity, etc.) who appears to be a pre-conventional moral reasoner, and describe how they demonstrate this? Do the same thing for one person who appears to be a principled moral reasoner.

2. Reflect on the choices made by Wells Fargo in its 2016 consumer deception scandal, and describe what an intensity analysis might have looked like for those choices, in terms of the six intensity factors discussed in your lesson (e.g. for “consensus”, briefly discuss how widely agreed it was that the actions taken by the banks were wrong, then do the same assessment for “probability of harm”, “imminence of harm”, etc.).

MGMT618 | LESSON 8

MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND MORAL INTENSITY

INTRODUCTION

Lesson Seven discussed the different codifications of moral precepts over the course of human history which have attempted to simplify moral prescriptions. Lesson Eight will introduce the various stages of moral development within individuals, as well as the way moral intensity is rationalized on a case-by-case basis.

Moral Development

As we have discussed in previous lessons, ethics rely on morality and a reasoned analysis of the factors that affect human well-being (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). However, at this juncture, it is important to note that not all individuals are capable of the same level of moral reasoning. Some of the differences in reasoning ability are attributable to age; the more mature that one is, the more likely they are to reach the higher levels of moral development. However, adulthood is not a guarantee that an individual will achieve the most sophisticated levels of moral reasoning. Some will never get there, and this is a significant obstacle to any hope of universally accepted objective morality.

Preconventional Reasoning

The pre-conventional level of moral reasoning is the most primitive. At the pre-conventional level, choices are assessed based only on personal consequences. In other words, the actor makes choices that render rewards and refrains from choices that render punishments (Graham, 1995). Preconventional reasoning is as much as non-human animal reasoning typically allows. Granted, it is not uncommon for some mammals to act self-sacrificially to preserve their offspring, and there have been reports of pets putting themselves in harm’s way to protect their human owners, but these are limited contexts. In almost every other situation, animals are driven first and foremost by self-preservation, and secondly, self-optimization. Preconventional reasoning is also the first strategy learned in the sequence of human development. Children typically think about their own consequences when deciding upon behavior. If doing chores is rewarded with an allowance, and coloring on the walls will result in grounding, children are likely to embrace the former and avoid the latter, all other things being equal. Although the vast majority of humans graduate from this level, it is important to note that many adults still regularly make choices that are based predominantly on preconventional reasoning. This is to say, selfish acts are frighteningly common.

Conventional Reasoning

The second level of moral reasoning is that of conventional reasoning. One step removed from pure selfishness, the conventional level of reasoning looks not simply to personal consequences (although this is still a factor), but also to social expectations in a societal context (Logsdon & Yuthas, 1997). Instances of conventional moral reasoning can be found almost anywhere one looks. For example, it is generally considered rude to cut other people in a line, so although one’s assessment of personal consequences might suggest that one should do so (cutting would get us to our goal faster), most of us would decline to cut because we’d rather not bare the shame and social indignation that would accompany such an act. Likewise, laws also function as a social expectation as well.

In a similar example, we know that ignoring traffic rules like speed limits would probably allow us to get to our destination more quickly, but then we must weigh that interest against several deterrents: one is that we might cause an accident that would result in injuries and damages (to us and/or others), another is the risk that we might be caught and punished with a traffic ticket (or worse), and a third is the social expectation from others on the road that we drive safely and not put other drivers in danger with our behavior, notwithstanding the law. So in this instance, the combination of potential consequences and social dissonance is what keeps us in conformance with the law (most of the time). To be fair, a valid argument could be made that concern about social implications is just an individual’s assessment of a different kind of personal consequence; but this is tangential to the bigger point that in a conventional reasoning context these factors are held in higher priority than some others. Many—if not, most—humans never ascend any higher on the ladder of reasoning development than conventional reasoning. Indeed, most people look to others in their lives (family, friends, and society in general) to set standards for their own conduct.

Principled Reasoning

The final level of moral reasoning development is that of principled reasoning. Preconventional motives of personal consequences and conventional motives of societal conformance are never completely removed from moral assessment, but principled reasoning subordinates those elements to a more important virtue: an objective assessment of right and wrong (Leming, 1978). In other words, individuals capable of principled reasoning are inclined to do the right thing in a given situation notwithstanding personal consequences or the popularity of such actions. The ability to reason at the principled level is far too rare (our history books would almost certainly be far less bloody and obscene of such abilities were common), but a few demonstrative examples stand out. Perhaps the most obvious is that of Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln was, of course, responsible for the end of slavery in the United States, but at the time this was not a political position that reaped many rewards or made many friends. Lincoln fought cunningly (and, some would say, underhandedly) to garner the necessary support for the 13th Amendment and the emancipation proclamation, and as a man who had already been elected to the highest office in the land, Lincoln had little to gain personally from such a move. Additionally, a majority of the nation’s legislature opposed the abolition of slavery, so the move was not in harmony with the zeitgeist of the time. Regardless, Lincoln was of such strong moral character that he found the idea of slavery to be fundamentally abhorrent regardless of its context, and he fought for its defeat with everything he had, ultimately giving in his life as an unexpected but not altogether unimaginable cost of his work in this regard. Another similar character in human history is that of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., about whom we’ve already discussed supra insofar as his transformational leadership style contributed to his notoriety. MLK Jr. was another principled moral thinker who made the ultimate sacrifice in furtherance of his reasoned assessment that color segregation was wrong, and that discrimination against anyone based on immutable characteristics offends the conscience. Imagine what the world might be like if everyone were as morally sophisticated as Lincoln or King.

Moral Intensity

Having discussed moral reasoning development, it is also important to review a number of different metrics by which individuals measure the “intensity” of the impact of their actions, in order to rationalize the most appropriate response (Barnett, 2001).

CONSENSUS

One factor is the consensus of opinion, or what percentage of the constituents involved perceive a particular choice to be wrong. If there is significant disagreement on this point, then the actor might not feel as much pressure to make one choice over the other. Suppose, as a simple example, that we are deciding on whether or not to support new climate change legislation. Given that there is a fair amount of disconsensus among the general public regarding the concern of climate change (despite the overwhelming scientific evidence), we might not feel much pressure toward either option.

PROBABILITY OF HARM

Another factor is the probability of harm associated with a particular choice. If harm is possible but not certain, and in fact very unlikely, then we might rationalize making a choice based on a low probability of harm. Using our climate change example, if even climate deniers concede that there might be a chance that climate change could be a real threat, then the probability of that chance will determine—in part—how likely we are to support the law.

IMMINENCE OF HARM

Yet another factor lies in how immediately any possible harm might be experienced. If harm is possible—or even probable—but the effects are a great length of time away (as opposed to tomorrow), then we are less likely to feel any urgency to act righteously from this element. This is the classic ‘frog in the boiling water’ phenomenon of procrastination. In the climate change scenario, because even the most dramatic estimates don’t project the most harmful effects for years, we are unlikely to be swayed by this factor.

PROXIMITY OF HARM

Proximity to victims is a rather heartless but very real rationale for human moral reasoning. The old adage that many people have no problem “eating the burger” but don’t want to “meet the cow” speaks directly to this point. If we have no personal risk of harm, and if we have no relationships with anyone else who does, then we are less likely to be concerned about the harm, regardless of its probability or imminence. In our climate change example, so long as we and the people we care about life in areas of the world that are unlikely to be dramatically affected, this is a non-sequitur.

CONCENTRATION OF HARM

Concentration of harm is concerned with how focused the harmful effects of a particular choice will be on those affected. If the effect is spread over a large number of people (or a large area), then even if the absolute value of the effect is large, it may only a result in a minor inconvenience for those affected, and this may help us to justify our action. In our climate change scenario, despite millions of tons of carbon emissions every year, the effects of climate change will likely only be a few degrees change in temperature and some elevation in sea level, so we might reason that the harm will be diluted over the global population as a whole.

GREATNESS OF HARM

A final factor is the greatness of the harm involved. This element deals not with the concentration of effect on victims, but instead on the total number of affected persons. In our climate change example, given that every single person on the planet would have to endure the effects of global warming, this is perhaps the biggest obstacle to hurdle in rationalizing an immoral choice.